States as laboratories:The politics of social welfare policies in India by Deshpande, Rajeshwari et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1080/14736489.2017.1279928
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Deshpande, R., Kailash, K. K., & Tillin, L. (2017). States as laboratories: The politics of social welfare policies in
India. India Review, 16(1), 85-105. https://doi.org/10.1080/14736489.2017.1279928
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
1 
 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in India 
Review in March 2017, available online at 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14736489.2017.1279928 
 
States as Laboratories: The Politics of Social Welfare Policies in India 
Rajeshwari Deshpande, KK Kailash and Louise Tillin 
 
Abstract 
This article examines the role of India’s states in shaping the implementation and framing of 
social policy within India’s federal system. Since the 2000s, the central government has 
overseen a substantial expansion of social welfare policies partly through a new push towards 
rights-based social provision. Most of the existing literature on the shift in social welfare 
coverage focuses on the national level. Yet, as we demonstrate in this article, it is India’s 
states that are both responsible for an increasing proportion of total public expenditure on 
social welfare provision as well as determining the nature and effectiveness of that provision 
across space. In addition to being the level of implementation for centrally designed 
programs, some states have themselves innovated by designing new social welfare programs, 
expanding national schemes or improving the capacity of the local state to effectively 
implement programs in more rule-bound ways that are less subject to local political 
intermediation. Factors internal to political competition within states also impact the ways in 
which relationships between states and markets have been altered in the course of 
implementing a new generation of welfare programs. Drawing on a comparative research 
programme across pairs of Indian states, we identify three critical factors in explaining how 
state-level political environments shape social policy: the role of policy legacies in shaping 
policy frames; the role of social coalitions underpinning political party competition; and the 
role of political leaders in strengthening state capacity to achieve program goals.  
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Introduction: India’s New Welfare Regime 
 
India introduced an important set of new social protection policies in the mid-2000s, like 
many other countries in the global south. The period since economic liberalization in 1991 
had seen a partial roll-back of the state. A gradual opening up of the economy both increased 
market space and allowed for greater international exposure and choice of goods and 
services, all this taking place within a tight fiscal policy regime. Sustained economic reforms 
derailed a welfarist orientation before it had produced substantial changes, unlike other parts 
of the world where welfare state restructuring began after it had produced improvements in 
educational and health standards and the quality of social services. However, just when it was 
thought that welfare oriented political mobilisation was out of fashion, the Congress-led 
United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government brought issues related to welfare back to the 
center of politics.  
New policies introduced from the mid-2000s focused particularly on social protection for 
India’s vast informal sector workforce. Although a majority of the Indian workforce operates 
in the informal economy, working conditions and insecurity of livelihoods within this huge 
sector were not a high public policy priority until the early 2000s. The existence of a large 
informal economy was perceived to be contingent, part of a transitional phase of capitalism 
and hence both the state as well as the trade union movement were not focused on 
interventions aimed at improving the welfare of the informal sector workers per se. 1 These 
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perceptions changed after 2000 as a result of both the increasing democratic pressures on 
governments (both central and states) and a realization that informalisation was here to stay 
within a more liberal economic environment. 
Some of the most prominent initiatives introduced by the Congress-led United Progressive 
Alliance (UPA) government after coming to office in 2004 were a major public employment 
programme for rural households (Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Act, 2005), the Social Security for Unorganised Workers Act, 2008 which included health 
insurance for informal sector workers (Rashtriya Swastha Bima Yojana), and the National 
Food Security Act which expanded the coverage and lowered the prices at which subsidised 
food is available to poor households. Significantly many of these new programs were 
introduced via legislation which provided a statutory backing to the entitlements or ‘rights’ 
they offered, in a deliberate attempt to make a break with an earlier patronage-driven mode of 
(selectively) providing benefits to the poor. Some went as far as to describe the reforms as 
‘audacious’.2  
State governments were at the front-end of both the squeezing of financial resources in the 
early years of liberalization as well as the expansion of provision under the subsequent 
inauguration of a new welfare regime. Economic liberalisation side-lined welfare as it was 
traditionally practiced and increased the possibilities of social tension and alienation. At the 
same time, when the UPA introduced a new welfare regime, it was quite different from the 
earlier model in that it built on shifting understandings of the relationship between the state, 
market and its citizens. These included the use of principles of choice in health insurance 
policies, and a shift from employer to state responsibility for social security.3 There has been 
substantial variation across states in how they adapted to, and themselves shaped, these shifts 
at the local level. Furthermore, states themselves, both before and after 2004, have been 
important originators of new social policies, some of which have also been scaled up. 
In this article, we first set out the constitutional role of the states in the field of social policy 
and look out how recent changes to the architecture of fiscal federalism cement their 
importance as the critical layer of implementation for social welfare programs. We then move 
on to present a framework to analyse how the differing nature of political regimes at the state 
level drives the variation we see across states in terms of the decisions they make about how 
to design and implement social policy, including the levels of expenditure and priorities they 
accord to social protection and ultimately the outcomes of social policies. In the second half 
of the paper, we introduce paired comparisons of two sets of states (Tamil Nadu-Kerala, and 
Maharashtra-West Bengal) to demonstrate more precisely the ways in which subnational 
political environments shape social policy. We outline how subnational political coalitions, 
policy legacies and political leadership affect the design and implementation of a newer 
generation of social welfare policies, focusing in particular on health insurance and social 
security for informal sector workers. These four states are medium-high income states and 
one state in each pair (Kerala and West Bengal) have a strong history of social democratic 
ruling parties. We thus control for factors (economic development or left-wing political 
mobilization) that have hitherto been seen as important in explaining social policy 
performance.  
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Through these paired comparisons, we demonstrate that Tamil Nadu and Kerala have taken 
advantage of a push towards health insurance at the national level to direct flows of money 
and patients to public rather than private health providers in an attempt to improve capacity 
and performance within government hospitals. This has taken place within subnational 
political environments that have favored the maintenance and expansion of public social 
welfare provision over time as a result of the rotation in power of coalition governments with 
broad social bases, and the incremental layering of policy reforms over time. On the other 
hand, in West Bengal and Maharashtra, we show that despite rather different histories, 
continued strategies of political incorporation of the poor via forms of institutionalized 
patronage has undermined the commitment of either state government to prioritizing the 
effective implementation of social security measures for informal workers in recent times.   
Drivers of Social Protection: Politics, Economics or Both? 
There is a common assumption that economic reforms and increased openness to 
international trade have reduced the role for political action in shaping policy altogether and 
therefore that changes in social policy are driven predominantly by economic causes rather 
than political ones.  For instance, Arvind Subramanian, chief economic advisor to the 
Government of India since 2014, extends to India the argument made by Dani Rodrik4 that 
countries had to increase their investment in social insurance to cushion against the volatility 
caused by globalization. In 2013, he wrote: 
Financial integration, whatever its merits, exposes the economy to greater volatility. 
Cushioning against this requires social insurance mechanisms—often in the form of 
greater spending, especially during downturns… In 2008 and 2009, the Indian 
economy, buffeted by the vagaries of international markets—because of India's 
increasing integration with them—had to deploy countercyclical fiscal policies. One 
legacy is increased government spending and larger overall deficits.5 
Yet the assumption that changes in social expenditure by national governments can be 
explained by exposure to international markets or predominantly economic factors has come 
under critical scrutiny in a wide literature.6 The revenues generated by economic growth have 
been critical in facilitating an expansion of social expenditure in many emerging economies, 
including India since 2003. But domestic politics remain important for understanding the 
divergent policy choices of governments when faced with a similar set of economic 
conditions.7  
When we scale down from the national to the state level,8 economic factors have also often 
taken pre-eminence in explaining the policy choices of subnational governments. Public 
choice economics from Charles Tiebout9 onwards has built on the assumption that the 
theoretical mobility of capital and citizens across the borders of subnational units leads 
governments to achieve an equilibrium between levels of taxation and public expenditure that 
reflects the interests of capital and a mobile citizenry. The outcome of inter-state competition 
– or ‘competitive federalism’ – is often held to result in a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of 
social expenditure as jurisdictions reduce taxes and expenditure to attract investment.10 
Recent increases in the proportion of central taxes transferred to states following the 
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recommendations of the Fourteenth Finance Commission raised concerns that they would 
lead states to cut back on social sector expenditure because of these kinds of pressure.  
However it is important to recognise that fiscal decentralization does not necessarily decrease 
the size of the state or public spending, especially if it entails the decentralization of 
expenditure powers without corresponding revenue-raising powers – as is the case in recent 
Indian reforms.11 The continued reliance of states on fiscal transfers from the central 
government reduces the incentives for competition between states of a kind that would 
necessarily lead to a race to the bottom. The recent reforms to indirect taxation with the 
introduction of a new Goods and Services Tax regime will further reduce the scope for inter-
state competition over rates of taxation. Thus inter-state competition need not result in a race 
to the bottom. Indeed the converse can also be true: subnational units can compete to improve 
provision, engaging in a ‘race to the top’.  
It is clear, then, that political environments within India’s states play a critical role in 
explaining the variation seen across the country in the shape of subnational welfare regimes.12 
There is wide variation across states in their progress on the multiple facets of poverty and 
deprivation. There is also considerable diversity in terms of their performance in the 
implementation of centrally designed social programs.13 Many states have introduced 
substantial innovations to the means by which they implement centrally designed policies. 
They have also introduced new schemes or extended the reach of existing central programs 
such as those focused on food security or health insurance for informal sector workers. On 
occasion, new schemes piloted at the state level have been scaled up to become national 
policy (such as Chhattisgarh’s Mitanin program for auxiliary health workers, or Andhra 
Pradesh’s Aarosgyari health insurance scheme).  
Changing Role of India’s States in Social Policy 
In most major areas of social policy, the central government and state governments have 
shared responsibilities under the Indian constitution. As Figure 1 shows, social security and 
social insurance, welfare of labor, and education (since 1976) all fall under the concurrent list 
of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The important exception to this pattern is Public 
Health, which is an exclusive constitutional responsibility of the states. Thus, the division of 
responsibilities envisaged by the constitution in this field is essentially a cooperative one. The 
central government has wide prerogatives in terms of initiating new policy in these areas, but 
the states remain the critical arena for policy implementation – as well as having the rights to 
initiate new policies themselves. Furthermore, it is in the process of implementation at the 
local level that policies are themselves shaped and reinvented in important ways.14 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Against this backdrop, a large proportion of social sector expenditure takes place at the state 
level. For instance, about 90 percent of total expenditure in health and education occurs at the 
state level.15 This is considerably higher than the share of the states in total expenditure which 
sits at around 50-60 percent.16 Inter-governmental transfers help the states to meet their 
shares of expenditure in these fields.   
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Over time, the contribution of the states to total social sector expenditure (across all areas of 
social sector spending, excluding food subsidies) has increased as a proportion of total 
government expenditure. Figure 2 presents an estimate of social sector expenditure by both 
tiers of government as a share of total government expenditure. While central government 
social expenditure has been expanding across the 2000s in absolute terms, in relative terms, it 
is the share of the states that has increased most substantially. Thus, it is critical to look at 
state-level expenditure when conceptualizing India’s welfare effort, contrary to recent 
analysis such as that of Devesh Kapur and Prakirti Nangia which has focused only on central 
government expenditure.17 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
The revenues at the states’ disposal have increased by virtue of increases in revenue 
collection at both levels of government. Untied statutory transfers via the Finance 
Commission have expanded in size as a result of improved revenues, while revenue 
collection at the state level has also improved. In 2013-14, ‘untied’ central government 
transfers to the states (a combination of the share of central taxation and statutory grants) 
accounted for approximately 26 percent of states’ total revenues.18 Many states supplement 
their social expenditure from revenues generated from state-level taxation. On average, about 
38% of total state expenditure today goes on social services, compared to 33% in 2006-7.19 
The critical role played by the states in determining overall levels of social expenditure has 
been enhanced by changes to the pattern of fiscal devolution in 2015 following the 
recommendations of the Fourteenth Finance Commission. Following these recommendations, 
the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government in its second budget oversaw a 
substantial enhancement to fiscal decentralization, with an increase in tax devolution to states 
from 32 to 42 percent.20 The biggest area of relevance to social policy was the future of 
support for what had previously been called ‘centrally sponsored schemes’. Many of the 
flagship welfare policies of the previous UPA government had taken the form of ‘centrally 
sponsored schemes’21 initiated and funded by line ministries rather than forming part of either 
the pool of revenues from taxation distributed between states according to the Finance 
Commission formulae, or the ‘Plan’ transfers for social and economic expenditure routed via 
the Planning Commission to the states. Conditional or tied funding via Centrally Sponsored 
Schemes overseen by central line ministries had been a key vehicle by which the central 
government sought to implement a new generation of social sector programs. Many centrally 
sponsored schemes required states to co- or match-fund central government expenditure. 
Their expansion had increased the discretionary nature of center-state transfers. As a result of 
criticisms about both the proliferation of such schemes and their centralized nature, they were 
moved from the oversight and budgets of central line ministries and routed directly to the 
states as ‘central assistance to states’ as part of ‘Plan’ expenditure in the 2014-15 budget.  
The total budgetary allocation in 2015-16 to what were previously called Centrally Sponsored 
Schemes, and what are now described as central assistance to states (CAS), was reduced by 
26 percent in 2015-16, as compared to the revised budget estimates for 2014-15 (which was 
itself Rs6 crores lower than the budget estimate for that year).22 This is in line with the 
increase in tax devolution to the states so that the overall volume of center-state transfers 
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remains broadly constant,23 but in theory the states receive a larger proportion of untied 
transfers that they can decide how to deploy.  
It is too early to say what the longer term effects of these changes in fiscal devolution will be. 
But as Prime Minister Narendra Modi (himself a former Chief Minister) explained, the 
decision to increase the untied component of center-state fiscal transfers in the 2015 budget 
was taken with the goal of giving states the freedom to decide how and whether to continue 
social welfare programs hitherto overseen by the central government. This has been seen as a 
major shift in the extent of central government commitment to the UPA-led new welfare 
model. By moving away from ‘tied’ or ‘conditional’ forms of inter-governmental transfer the 
central government reduced its leverage with the states to require them to co-fund social 
policies. Instead the government espoused a vision of cooperative and competitive federalism 
(a so-called ‘Team India’) that hinged on policy experimentation and ‘healthy’ competition 
among India’s states to promote investment in policies aimed at poverty reduction and 
development. Narendra Modi resurrected an old Nehruvian tradition of writing to Chief 
Ministers in the states to inform them: 
We are moving away from rigid centralized planning, forcing a ‘One size fits all’ 
approach on states....Our Government has decided to devolve maximum money to 
states and allow them the required freedom to plan the course of states’ development. 
The additional 10 percent of resources being devolved will give you this freedom. In 
this overall context when you are flush with resources, I would like you to have a 
fresh look at some of the erstwhile schemes and programmes supported by the centre. 
States are free to continue or change these schemes and programmes as per their 
discretion and requirement…This is all towards the fulfilment of my promise of co-
operative federalism.24  
 
In the first year of this new financial settlement, there has not been a substantial shift in the 
fiscal commitments of the states to the social sector (and some states have increased their 
expenditure in this field).25 But funding uncertainties have affected program operation and 
the longer term consequences of this change to fiscal devolution are yet to be seen. However, 
whatever happens politics at the state level will remain a crucial driver of variation in 
outcomes across states. In the next section, we move on to examine in more detail the 
relationship between constellations of subnational politics and social policy performance. 
 
Part II. Subnational Political Regimes and Social Policy 
In almost all states, with only a few exceptions, political leaders recognize that increasing 
outlays in the social sector are ways to enhance their popularity with voters and thus increase 
their chances of re-election.26 Thus welfare-related promises are a central part of electoral 
contests across India. Yet the effectiveness with which welfare commitments are pursued 
varies. 
The existing literature which has sought to explain the variation among Indian states in the 
extent of social policy coverage or public goods provision is of two types. On one hand, 
8 
 
large-N studies have sought to explain variation in levels of expenditure on public goods over 
time. The findings of these studies are inconclusive and contradictory. Whereas Chhibber and 
Nooruddin find that two-party systems at the state level provide more public goods because 
politicians must cultivate a wider public appeal,27 Saez and Sinha find that more fragmented 
party systems see higher levels of expenditure on public goods because of the greater degree 
of political uncertainty in such states.28 A partial explanation for this contradiction might 
hinge on levels of turnout: Nooruddin and Simmons find that in more fragmented party 
systems where turnout is higher, the size of the winning coalition is larger and politicians will 
spend more on public goods.29 Yet overall this literature is too sparse and contradictory to 
offer clear conclusions on how politics affects social policy. As Hicken and Simmons 
acknowledge, expenditure may also be a weak proxy for the quality of social service 
delivery.30 Furthermore these studies do not help to explain the substantial variation that is 
seen among two-party systems within India.  
On the other hand, there are several exercises in qualitative subnational comparison within 
India. In a now classic study, Atul Kohli highlighted the role of penetrative, well-organized, 
left-of-center regimes in doing better at reducing poverty.31 His analysis focused in particular 
on the case of West Bengal following the rise to power there of the Communist Party of 
India. But in more recent times, ideology appears to be a weaker predictor of social policy 
effort. As we have documented elsewhere,32 states that have recently expanded their 
commitment to social policy and augmented administrative capacity to implement social 
sector schemes include what can be labelled the ‘incorporationist’ states of Chhattisgarh and 
Odisha. These are states that have very little left-wing influence on government, and also 
continue to be ruled by a fairly narrow upper caste-class alliance. Furthermore, states like 
West Bengal, earlier reputed to be stronger welfare actors, have weakened their position in 
this respect. They are thus not explained well by Kohli’s earlier typology, nor by newer 
exercises such as that by John Harriss.33 Harriss built on Kohli but highlighted that progress 
had since been seen in a larger range of states. His typology focused on the extent to which 
upper caste/class dominance had been challenged and institutionalized in state-level party 
systems as the earlier hegemony of the Congress Party came to be unsettled. Yet, as we have 
suggested, the newer range of welfare actors may also sit uneasily with Harriss’ typology 
since they include states in which upper caste dominance has persisted.  
A third mixed method approach has been employed by Prerna Singh who demonstrates a 
connection between levels of social solidarity, or what she terms ‘subnationalism’, and social 
development (health and education) outcomes across states.34 This is innovative work, but 
looking at a wider range of indicators including state-level performance on newer social 
protection schemes, suggests that even states with higher levels of subnationalism on Singh’s 
index such as Punjab, Haryana or Gujarat have not fared strongly in policy implementation.35 
Given the limitations of the existing literature and the opening up of new variation in social 
policy outcomes across states related to the implementation of a new generation of central 
programmes, our recent research has focused on examining afresh which features of the 
subnational political landscape are important in explaining difference in outcomes across 
space. Three features emerge as particularly salient in our analysis: 1) policy legacies; 2) 
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breadth of social and political coalitions; 3) political leadership. We see these features 
working in conjunction with broader configurations within regional political economies to 
explain how states approach the design and implementation of new social policies. We thus 
recognize that we are dealing with multi-causal stories in which there are multiple pathways 
to relatively stronger, and relatively weaker, welfare regimes. In the next two sections, we 
explore how these factors help us to explain variation in state-level performance across two 
paired comparisons – Kerala and Tamil Nadu, and Maharashtra and West Bengal. These pairs 
include states with a history of left-wing political strength (Kerala and West Bengal), and 
they all represent middle income states. The contrasts between, and across, the pairs reinforce 
the need to look at the conjuncture of leadership, social and political coalitions, and policy 
legacies within the backdrop of wider state-level political economies. 
 
Exploring State-Level Regimes I: Kerala and Tamil Nadu 
In this section we examine how two states, Tamil Nadu and Kerala successfully adapted to 
the new welfare regime with a special focus on the health sector. Health has traditionally 
been a public good with the state as primary provider. However, with liberalization, social 
services like health were also opened up to the market. While the market has entered different 
sectors in health, we limit our focus to health insurance. Publicly funded health insurance 
allows political leaders to step on two stools at the same time. On one hand, it opened up 
private health care institutions to the larger public and on the other hand it enhanced the 
status of private for-profit health care providers. The underlying logic being that requirements 
of social welfare and the market can go together.  
Andhra Pradesh was the first state to introduce a publicly funded health-insurance scheme in 
2007. The Rajiv Gandhi Aarogyasri Scheme provides quality health care for people living 
below the poverty line. The government pays the premium, and the beneficiary gets cashless 
treatment in any ‘empaneled’ hospital (public or private) across the state. Subsequent analysis 
has revealed that the scheme predominantly benefited the private and corporate healthcare 
sector. A bulk of the procedures were not only done in private hospitals but more 
importantly, the districts with poor health infrastructure saw fewer surgeries as compared to 
those where the private health care providers were well established.36 The political-economy 
of the health care sector in the state explains why the scheme tilted towards the private 
healthcare sector.37  
In sharp contrast to Andhra Pradesh, the public-private mix has taken a different turn in 
Tamil Nadu and Kerala. Though both states were influenced by the Andhra model, their 
schemes advantaged the public health care system rather than the private sector. At the same 
time, both states took different paths to privileging the public sector in the wake of increasing 
pressures to open up to market forces. 
The central government launched the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) in 2008. The 
scheme was initially targeted at the BPL population in one district across each state, though 
subsequently it was expanded to cover other categories of unorganized workers and most 
districts in many states. The RSBY was clearly a new welfare regime policy. On one hand it 
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spoke of 'empowering the beneficiary' by providing the 'freedom of choice' between public 
hospitals. On the other hand, it also referred to the beneficiary as a 'potential client worth 
attracting on account of the significant revenues that hospitals stand to earn through the 
scheme'.38 The scheme identified what it called four stakeholders, the insurers, hospitals, 
intermediaries and the government and also spelled out their respective incentives. Like most 
centrally sponsored schemes, the funding was shared between the center (75 percent) and the 
states (25 percent). The beneficiary paid only Rs. 30/- as enrolment fees. 
In implementing this central policy initiative, Tamil Nadu and Kerala took different 
decisions. Tamil Nadu chose to introduce its own scheme funded fully by the state 
government, while Kerala adopted the RSBY scheme. Kerala was one of the first states 
permitted to implement the scheme across all districts. At the same time, Kerala also decided 
to open the scheme to families other than the BPL families as well as those who wished to 
pay the premium themselves. Traditionally, when states have not had their way, in receiving 
funding from the central government for specific programs and schemes, financial 
arrangements have quickly become an object of center-state friction. For instance, in the mid 
'60s when the central government refused to increase the financial resources to continue with 
the cheap food grains scheme or refused to compensate Tamil Nadu for the loss of revenue in 
implementing dry (alcohol prohibition) laws in the state, it blamed the central government 
and argued that the center was discriminating against the state.39 However, in the new welfare 
regime, many states are not only better prepared to manage the exigencies, but have also 
experimented with central or centrally inspired schemes to their own benefit.  
Though the basic model of the publicly funded insurance model was the same, both states 
brought significant variations to the scheme aiming to publicly finance the demand rather 
than the supply of healthcare. Both states were clearly going against the grain in so far as 
government-funded insurance schemes had hitherto been ‘tilting the funds to the already 
flourishing private sector while the public sector is starved of funds’.40 In Kerala, the low 
rates set by the state government for various medical procedures under RSBY made it 
unattractive for the private sector to offer these procedures. In Tamil Nadu, while the rates 
were not touched, certain procedures and treatments were reserved for the public sector. 
What appeared to be a minor tweaking was, in fact, based on a clear political logic.41 
Whenever markets are introduced in public welfare services, it has been found that they 'take 
power away from incumbent professionals', since the public sector now has to compete for 
the same resources which it hitherto got 'non-competitively'.42 Here again it is important to 
note that public policy often determines the scope and extent of space given to private 
players. In Tamil Nadu the reservation of procedures was based on demands from public 
sector medical college faculty, who were apprehensive that teaching would be hampered if 
adequate surgical procedures did not come their way. Similarly, in Kerala, the decision to 
'price out' the private sector was intended to push money towards the public-sector, improve 
its infrastructural 'quality' and thus attract the bulging middle class into government hospitals. 
It is clear that both Tamil Nadu and Kerala, unlike Andhra Pradesh which empowered the 
private sector, increased the scope of state control in the health sector.  
There is clearly no one model public-private mix in social welfare. When markets are 
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introduced in public services, the outcomes could vary since the public-private space can be 
manipulated to suit different interests.43 The question for us is not the impact of the 
introduction of the market in social services, but why the public-private mix varies. We argue 
that three dimensions are crucial to understanding how states adapt legislation or initiatives 
they receive from the central government. These include, political leadership, past legacy and 
political coalitions.  
The term political coalition is not used in the restricted sense to denote governmental 
coalitions, but includes a collectivity of social and political groups who come together to 
achieve common goals.  Political parties in Tamil Nadu and Kerala have built social 
coalitions that have brought together varied strands of society. Even if the party-systems are 
relatively more fragmented compared to other states, the political and social coalitions have 
reduced the impact of fragmentation and also created a sense of shared identity. Both states 
have multi-party competition with two-dominant parties. At the same time, both states have 
experimented with a wide variety of political coalitions, which have brought different parties 
together. While the smaller parties within the coalition, may cater to sectional and 
particularistic territorially concentrated interests, the dominant players who have a state-wide 
presence work towards aggregation.44 This is in sharp contrast to some of other states, where 
social identity mobilization has not only pitted different groups against each other but also 
enhanced resentment limiting what governments can offer when it comes to public welfare. 
Consequently, there is a broad social consensus on the policy frame and on issues around 
which political parties compete which has, in turn, helped create standard expectations. The 
difference between political parties is typically on the specifics of a particular policy rather 
than the overall direction itself.  Since the competing coalitions are representative of the 
social diversity in the states, there is a strong level of continuity between different 
governments on welfare policies, clearly underlining the social support for a publicly 
provided welfare regime. 
Though the insurance schemes in both states were institutionalised by rival coalition 
governments, the subsequent governments in both states continued with the schemes and also 
increased their reach. In Kerala, the Congress-led United Democratic Front government in 
2011 for instance, started a special scheme called the Karunya Benevolent Fund to take care 
of highly expensive treatments. This scheme was financed through income from the sale of 
lotteries.  Similarly, in Tamil Nadu, the public-private mix got a distinctive public tilt when 
the AIADMK (All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam) regime took over from the 
DMK (Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam). At the same time, the AIADMK regime also extended 
the scheme to Sri Lankan refugees, differently abled persons without income ceiling, farm 
laborers, small and marginal farmers and contract employees of Tamil Nadu State Marketing 
Corporation (TASMAC).  
When we speak of political leadership in these cases, our focus is not a particular individual 
leader but in leadership and more specifically on 'developmental leadership' which is 
essentially a political process. It involves the 'organization and mobilization of people and 
resources in pursuit of particular goals.45 Most importantly, there is an acute sense of 
understanding of the context, which helps to overcome collective action problems which 
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obstruct the achievement of goals. Given the political coalitions, they lead, political leaders 
are often constrained to maintain and consolidate a welfare commitment. Yet, in other states, 
political leaders may play a more exogenous role in challenging earlier legacies. This was the 
case, for instance, with respect to far-reaching reforms to the Public Distribution System 
(PDS) in Chhattisgarh and may also be important in Odisha in recent times.46 
We also believe that past legacy plays an important role and policy decisions of today are not 
independent of the past. Given the past history of welfarism in the two states, the political 
leadership could not obviously abandon their commitment in the wake of financial squeezing 
or the market shift in welfare provisioning. Both states have transformed health service 
delivery along the way through a process of 'layering'.47 Layering is probably the least painful 
way of bringing about change. In this process, old practices and structures are not abandoned 
but instead new practices and structures are built alongside or on top of the old. We saw that 
when new private actors entered the health sector, the older public sector was not ignored. 
Instead, new actors were grafted into the existing framework. Moreover, since the two states 
prided themselves on the quality of their public health system, they naturally privileged the 
old actors over the new players. Layering suits developmental leaders, since it allows them to 
introduce change while not unduly threatening existing interests. On one hand, it allows the 
continuation of a public welfare model and on the other hand, it creates space for the market 
as well. 
Exploring State-Level Political Regimes II: Maharashtra and West Bengal 
In its study of the state of social sector expenditure in states during 2015-16, the 
Accountability Initiative draws attention to two significant trends.48 One, it shows how 
despite an overall increase in the expenditure on social sector in state budgets, social sector 
spending, when analyzed as a percentage of total expenditure, has decreased marginally in 
many states. Secondly, the initiative notes how investments in social sector vary both at inter- 
state level and across sectors during this period. Both these conclusions prove useful in 
understanding the framing of social sector policies in what may be seen as ‘less consistent’ 
welfare regimes in states such as Maharashtra and West Bengal.  
Our description of West Bengal as a less consistent welfare regime may come as a surprise to 
many since the state has long been known for its social democratic character and 
redistributive agenda. Maharashtra, on the other hand, has always been categorized as a pro- 
business state, along with Gujarat and Karnataka, where welfare policies remain more 
marginal in political discourse. Our examination of issues surrounding the social security of 
informal sector workers reveals that the discourse of welfare in both these states contains 
various internal inconsistencies and that these inconsistencies contribute to the 
marginalization of claims of the poor in the politics of both these states, albeit in different 
ways.49  
The Unorganised Workers Social Security Act (UWSSA) brought together various ongoing 
social security schemes and sought to extend social security to workers in the informal sector. 
It located the responsibility of protecting informal sector workers with the state and freed the 
market as well as the private employers of responsibilities.50 It also did not envisage a central 
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role for non-state actors such as NGOs and trade unions in the implementation of social 
security schemes. A central recommendation of the legislation was the constitution of 
national and state level social security boards as advisory bodies for the state governments in 
implementing the act.    
How did states, particularly Maharashtra and West Bengal use the act to extend social 
security to the informal sector workers? The structuring of regional political economies and 
their past political legacies played a major role. Maharashtra had pursued an aggressive 
agenda of economic liberalization since the 1980s and thus became one of the most urbanized 
and economically advanced states in the country. Urbanization in Maharashtra coupled with 
growing agrarian distress led to steady migration to the urban centers and swelling ranks of 
migrant workers absorbed in sundry services. The state also witnessed the rise of labor 
politics since the early post-independence period. However, the issues of the laboring poor 
and concerns about their welfare never became a key aspect of the electoral mobilizations in 
the state. Instead, Maharashtra developed a well-knit Congress system that survived intact for 
a long time on the basis of successful accommodation of entrenched interests and with an 
institutionalized system of patronage. Maharashtra’s party system became somewhat more 
competitive with the entry of the BJP – Shiv Sena coalition in the late 1980s. However, the 
texture of politics largely remained the same under the new system.  
Politics and the economy of West Bengal developed differently under the leadership of the 
Communist parties. With the Left having roots in the history of mobilizational politics, 
Bengal created a regional variety of parliamentary communism that was more reformist than 
radical in its praxis. Left reformism was electorally successful in West Bengal in the 1980s 
due to moderate levels of economic growth coupled with a redistributive agenda. Yet, the 
politics of trade unionism remained limited in scope throughout this period in spite, or 
perhaps because of, the Left’s successful appropriation of the transformative discourse. 
Instead, the Left hegemony resulted in the formation of what Bhattacharya calls ‘party- 
society’.51 The Left’s monopoly over the party-society space subsumed trade union activism 
under partisan contestations and even monopolized the definitions of labor and the 
appropriate forms of its politics. As a result, despite its celebratory appropriations of the 
workers as vanguards of revolution, the actual extent of labor politics in Bengal remained 
limited under the Left regime.  The arrival of a new political regime in the state in 2011 has 
seen a further decline in labour politics as even its ideological legitimacy was challenged.  
The past legacies and the structuring of political competition in these two states thus lead to a 
paradox where issues of labor welfare and social security have been celebrated notionally- in 
the patronage discourses in Maharashtra and in the Left discourse in Bengal. Yet, both states 
fail to extend robust social security measures for the laboring poor in the informal sector. 
Prior to the passage of the ‘Unorganized Workers’ Social Security Act’ by the central 
government in 2008, both states had instituted some mechanisms of social security for 
informal sector workers. Maharashtra largely relied on state patronage and came up with 
targeted schemes for different sections of the informal sector workers (such as the Hamal 
Mapadi Mahamnadal for head loaders; Construction workers’ welfare board, Bidi workers’ 
welfare board, etc). A somewhat unorthodox presence of trade union politics in Maharashtra 
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forced the state to involve market forces and the employers in extending social assistance to 
sections of informal sector workers like the head loaders. Accordingly, tripartite welfare 
boards were set up where representatives of the state, employers and employees were 
expected to work together in designing and implementing social security measures. The work 
of these boards remained fraught with constant confrontations among the stakeholders and 
more importantly due to the paucity of funds.  
In West Bengal, the state’s social assistance programs for the poor were shaped in the context 
of its social democratic legacies and thus more universal rather than targeted schemes were 
instituted for the informal sector workers.52 The state assisted scheme for informal sector 
workers in West Bengal worked on the insurance logic but did not hold private employers 
accountable for social security. Besides the new initiatives came at a time when the 
government of West Bengal had changed its economic policies and had begun to relieve 
employers towards their responsibility for worker welfare in order to attract more capital to 
the state.53 The insurance model also suffered due to non-availability of state funds, uneven 
implementation of the scheme and lack of necessary infrastructure created by the state. 
Instead, the social assistance scheme remained enmeshed in the ‘party- society’ framework as 
the eligibility of the applicant of the scheme was to be certified by members of local 
government bodies.   
The use of social security measures as extensions of political patronage by the ruling parties 
remains a recurring theme in the narratives in both Maharashtra and West Bengal. 
Maharashtra witnessed competitive political mobilization of female domestic workers in 
more recent times when the state enacted the domestic workers welfare act with an eye on the 
emerging woman constituency in the state.54 All the mainstream political parties in the state 
used the act as a political vehicle in the local elections. However, although it granted some 
political visibility to domestic workers in the state, the act did not extend any substantial 
social security benefits to them.  
Finally, the effective implementation of the social security schemes for informal sector 
workers in both states was also marred by inadequate budgetary provisions and shifting 
priorities of the states in terms of internal allocations of funds to various key social services.  
A review of social sector expenditures in Maharashtra during 2008-2016 reveals declining 
trends in various social sector spending within the state. As per the budgetary estimate of 
2015-16 the share of per capita expenditure on social services in the total government 
expenditure saw a significant decline from 38.03 in 20145-15 to 36.52 in 2015-16.55  In 
addition to that, a significant share of social sector expenditure is allocated to education and 
health services, leaving very little for schemes of social assistance for the poor. In fact, the 
central, as well as state legislations on social security for informal sector workers, did not 
provide for specific budgetary allocations for these schemes. Instead, the acts merely 
suggested a compilation of various welfare schemes for the poor under the auspices of the 
welfare boards. Thus, the onus was placed on state governments to both implement and 
determine funding for these measures. The situation in West Bengal, too, is comparable. The 
state has consistently added to the share of social sector expenditure to its total expenditure 
over the past fifteen years. However, a large part of the social sector expenditure is spent on 
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health and education, and the more specific requirements of the informal sector workforce are 
not accounted for in the state budget. The scant availability of financial resources thus 
reinforces the less consistent, ad hoc and politically motivated policy approach towards the 
social security of the informal sector workforce. The ad hoc policy approach emerges as a 
combination of past legacies, shaping of regional political economies, political party 
competition and the resulting political culture that encourages only selective inclusion of the 
working poor in the policy process.   
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we have shown that India’s new and evolving welfare regime cannot be 
understood from the top-down. It is only by looking at the ways in which central legislation 
and policy direction is received and shaped in the implementation process within states that 
both the achievements and challenges of a new era of social legislation can be understood. As 
states take on a larger responsibility for financing social expenditure, as a result of new fiscal 
devolution rules, their role in setting priorities and initiating new policies, as well as shaping 
the implementation of ongoing centrally initiated programs, will be enhanced. In this article, 
based on the findings of an ongoing research programme, we have shown how patterns of 
political competition at the subnational level and regional political cultures coalesce to 
produce particular policy legacies that shape the way that states have approached the 
provision of social security for informal sector workers. Political leaders and the social 
coalitions they lead play an important role in shaping the relationship between state and 
markets as they impinge upon the delivery of social services and social security for the 
laboring poor. 
We have shown that Tamil Nadu and Kerala have used the introduction of health insurance to 
rebalance the relationship between public and private providers, in contrast to other states 
where insurance-based financing has supported the expansion of private healthcare. This has 
been accompanied by a progressive widening of program coverage. Whereas in Maharashtra 
and West Bengal, despite histories of left-wing and/or trade union organization, political 
coalitions have obscured the interests of informal sector workers such that they remain targets 
for selective inclusion rather than rights-bearing claimants of welfare. In providing a sketch 
of how these dynamics work within particular regional conditions, we hope to inspire further 
research on the linkages between subnational politics and policy outcomes in comparative 
perspective.   
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Figures 
Figure 1. Constitutional Division of Responsibility for Social Policy 
Union List State List Concurrent list 
Regulation of labour and 
safety in mines and oilfields 
 
Union pensions (pensions 
payable by Government of 
India or out of Consolidated 
Fund of India) 
Public health and sanitation; 
hospitals and dispensaries 
 
State pensions (all pensions 
payable by the State or out 
of Consolidated Fund of the 
State) 
Economic and social 
planning 
 
Social security and social 
insurance; employment and 
unemployment 
 
Welfare of labor including 
conditions of work, 
provident funds, employers’ 
liability, workmen’s 
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old age pensions and 
maternity benefits 
 
Education, including 
technical education, medical 
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Note: Figure reproduced from Louise Tillin, Rajeshwari Deshpande and KK Kailash (2015), 
Politics of Welfare: Comparisons across India’s States. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.  
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Figure 2. Social Sector Expenditure by Centre and States as 
Percentage of Total Government Expenditure
Central government expenditure State government expenditure
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Source: Data calculated from Tables 1.1, 2.1 and 3.1 of Indian Public Finance Statistics 2014-15, Ministry of 
Finance at http://finmin.nic.in/reports/IPFStat201415.pdf (accessed 15 February 2016) 
Notes: Social sector spending includes total expenditure on budget categories of social and community services 
plus rural development. Central government expenditure includes the totals reported in these budget categories 
in table 2.1 plus the estimated share of non-apportionable central plan grants spent by the states on the social 
sector. The states’ share of total social sector expenditure, therefore, provides an estimate of the amount that 
states spend on the social sector from the untied revenues at their disposal (a combination of their own revenues 
and share of central taxation). Our thanks to Indira Rajaraman for assistance with the data. Any errors are our 
own. 
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